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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARY HARDING,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.
12475

vs.
·Ji FRANK BOHMAN,
. i.I
Defendant and Respondent.

APP·ELLANT'S BRIEF
)

81

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action brought by the plaintiff claiming
a right-of-way through the land of the defendant, which
claim is based on a public dedication by use or a private
right-of-way acquired by prescriptive use and pursuant
' to the laws of the State of Utah. The Second Judicial
District Court in and for Morgan County in a hearing
which took place on the 14th day of December, 1970,
the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge, presiding, in a
memorandum decision and judgment ruled that the
plaintiff had failed to establish that the road in question
had been dedicated by public use and the Court ignored

· IO:

I

and failed to rule on the other questions raised and aJ.
leged by the plaintiff-appellant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff-appellant seeks a reversal of the trial
court's decision as to the one issue decided by the Court
and that in any event the case be remanded to the lower
court with instructions to grant the relief prayed for
in the complaint on any one of the grounds alleged in
said complaint.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dry Hollow Road is located in Morgan County,,
Utah. It runs in a general easterly direction through
property owned by defendant-respondent (hereinafter!
designated as "respondent"), and thereafter through:
property belonging to plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter I
designated as "appellant"). (T: 4.5, Exhs. A. B. 17).'
Among other things, it has been used to maintain a spring,
in the East Half of the Southwest Quarter of Section 3),
Township 5 North, Range 2 East of the Salt Lake Meri·
dian, and for access for use of irrigation waters arising•
in what is known as Dry Creek. The water right of ap·.
pellant's predecessor in interest to use the waters of Dry•
Creek, as well as the excess water of the aforementioned
spring, dates back to the year 1866. (T: 25, 35, Exh. C
(page 28, rt. # 189).
Mr. John L. Young, now 75 years of age, remem· ·
bers Dry Hollow Road as being in existence since the
2

time he was 10 years old, or a period of 65 years. He
considered it a public road in use by deer hunters "and
that" made it such. "There was always travel up that
way." (Sheepmen and deer hunters.) There was no restriction on this activity "until later years." For a period of 50 or 60 years "there was nobody stopped them
from going there." (T: 75, 76, 77, 78).
On the 9th day of February, 1917, respondent's
predecessors in interest entered into a "Water Deed and
Agreement" with the "Board of Education of Morgan
County, Utah," under the terms of which respondent's
predecessors in interest conveyed and warranted to the
School Board "all their right, title and interest in and
to the water" of the above mentioned spring. In addition to the grant of water, the "Water Deed and Agreement" recites as follows:
"also a perpetual right-of-way and easement one
rod in width over and across the lands owned
by said parties of the second part hereinbefore
mentioned, for the purpose of laying a pipe line
and maintaining the same to convey the waters
of said spring, and for ingress and egress to the
said party of the first part, agents, employees,
and contractors for the purpose of laying said
pipe line and making repairs, inspection, maintenance, and improvement of the same, the said
use to be at as little damage as possible to the
said parties of the second part, the said right of
way and easement to be in a westerly direction
from said spring and along the course of stakes
heretofore staked and laid out by Bostaph and
Roach, engineers, one half of said right of way
and easement to be on each side of said pipelines
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as finally laid, and the parties of the second par1
agree to execute a Deed for same containing a
particular description thereof to be as furnishea
by the said Bosteph and Roach."
In consideration of said conveyance, the Board ol
Education granted the respondent's predecessors in in·
terest two connections to the pipe line. (Exh. 1).
In the year 1920, the School Board constructed a

roadway along the right-of-way conveyed to it by re·
spondent's predecessors in interest. (T: 8). In 1937, the
School Board, by warranty deed, conveyed its water
rights in the above mentioned spring, and all appurte·
nances, to the Peterson Corporation of the Church ol
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. This warranty deea
contains the following language:
"To be transferred under the following con&!
tions: that the property described herein be per·
manently maintained intact and used for public
benefit and to remain nontransferrable in part or
whole to private enterprise and that a reasonable
effort be made by the grantee to maintain and
use the property for the best interest of the com·
munity." (T: 11, 12, Exh. 2).
I

Dry Hollow Road has been used by deer hunters,'
tree cutters, irrigators, fence builders, farmers, neckers,
sheepmen, and the general public from before 1900 until
1964 without restriction. (T: 25, 34, 35, 39, 40, 54, 57,
61, 63, 67, 69, 76, 77, 78, 79, 97, 99, 101, 102, 103, 113).
In 1961, at the time the freeway was under construction,
the State of Utah fenced off the property line where Dry'
4
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Hollow Road begins and proceeds across respondent's
land. The gates in this fence were installed by the State
Highway Department. (T: 6).
Until 1953, there was no lock on Dry Hollow Road
entrance to respondent's land from the public road. In
1953, respondent put a lock on the gate leading into appellant's land, and the lock was there for 4 years. However, appellant's predecessors in interest had a key to
the lock. (T: 123, 128, 129).
One person paid respondent's predecessor in interest $20.00 for taking his sheep up the roadway, but this
was for damage the sheep did to the surrounding pasture,
and not for the use of the road. (T: 91, 93).

!

In July of 1964, respondent paid the School Board
the sum of $10.00 for a Quit Claim Deed to the property
the School Board had previously conveyed by warranty
deed (in 193 7) to the Peterson Corporation of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, and which contained
the above cited recitations. Thereafter, respondent refused to permit appellant and appellant's predecessors in
interest to use the Dry Hollow Road. (T: 115, Exh. 3).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The Legislature reenacted Section 27-1-2, now Section 27-12-89, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, as
amended, which states as follows:
"Public use constituting dedication - A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and
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abandoned to the use of the public when it has
been continuously used as a public thoroughfare
for a period of ten years."
One of the basic issues before the Court in this case
is the application of this statute to the facts as shown in
the record and as this statute has been interpreted by
this Court in other cases heretofore decided involving
an interpretation of this statute.
There is evidence in the record that there was, in ,
fact, a public dedication of the highway in question and:
that the provisions of Section 27-1-3, UTAH CODE AN.
NOTATED, 1953, as amended, should have been con·
sidered and applied by the lower court.
I
1

I

The court below made no decision as to whether or I
not the plaintiff-appellant had acquired a prescriptive:
right to the use of the defendant-respondent's thorough·:
fare in question.
I

The court below made no reference or mention to [
the provisions of Section 73-1-15, UTAH CODE AN· I
NOTATED, as amended, which allows the plaintiff·
respondent a right-of-way through the land of the de· '
fendant-respondent to maintain her water right, which
right is clearly shown in the record.
1
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DRY
HOLLOW ROAD IS NOT A PUBLIC ROAD BECAUSE THE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY ESTABLISHES (A) THAT DRY HOLLOW ROAD HAS BEEN USED BY THE PUBLIC FOR OVER
SIXTY YEARS WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND IMPLIED
ACQUIESCENCE OF THE OWNERS OF THE FEE TITLE OF
THE LAND OVER WHICH IT PASSES, AND (B) DRY HOLLOW ROAD WAS DEDICATED TO PUBLIC USE BY A
RECORDED PUBLIC DOCUMENT EXECUTED BY THE
SCHOOL BOARD OF MORGAN COUNTY, UTAH.

The record in this case clearly indicates that for
over sixty years Dry Hollow Road was used at will by
hunters, sheep herders, fence builders, farmers and the
general public. This use was with the knowledge of the
owners of the land over which it passed and without
objection on their part (see Statement of Facts).
(A) Section 27-12-89, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953, as amended states as follows:
"A highway shall be deemed to have been
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public
when it has been continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period of ten years."
The Utah Supreme Court has had many occasions
to construe the above cited statute or its predecessors
which were worded identically. In an early Utah case
reported in 16 UT AH 240; 51 P. 980, Whitaker vs.
Ferguson, the Court defined a "thoroughfare" and the
conditions under which it became public. The Court said:
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". . . A thoroughfare is a place or way through
which there is passing or travel. It becomes a
'public thoroughfare' when the public has a gen.
eral right of passage. Under this statute the high.
way, even though it be over privately owned
ground, will be deemed dedicated or abandoned
to the public use when the public has continu.
ously used it as a thoroughfare for a period of
ten years . . ."
In the case of Clark vs. Erekson, 9 UTAH 2nd 212; 341,
P. 2nd 424, <July, 1959) the Court stated:

"There was testimony by witnesses, some of
whom could remember back to 1890, that Erek·
son Lane had been used by the general public,
either walking or riding in wagons and later in i
automobiles. The road was being constantly used
by people either to go to church or to fish in
Little Cottonwood Creek through which the lane
passed, or as a short cut north between 59th South
and Vine Street. There was no evidence that per· i
mission was sought or given by anyone to use i
this short cut. . . . This evidence is sufficient to ,
establish a dedication of the road by user under [
the provisions of Section 27-1-2, UTAH CODE:
ANNOTATED, 1953, the evidence being uncon· i
tradicted that Erekson Lane was being used as a '
highway by the public generally for more than i
ten years."
1

1

1

In another early case, Schettler vs. Lynch, 23 UTAH
305; 64 P. 955, the Court held that "land having been
once dedicated by the owners of the soil as a highway,
and having been accepted by the public, all subsequent
grantees of the abutting lands are bound by such dedication, and have no right to obstruct any portion of the

street."
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(B) On February 9, 1917, (after Dry Hollow Road
had been used by the public for over twenty years) respondent's predecessors in interest conveyed Dry Hollow
Road to the Board of Education of Morgan County, Utah.
(See exh. 1). In the year 1920 the Board of Education,
which is a body politic of the State of Utah, constructed
a road over the Dry Hollow Thoroughfare. (T:) In 1937,
some twenty years after its purchase of the Dry Hollow
Road and some seventeen years after the construction
work done on the road, the Board of Education deeded
the road to the Peterson Corporation of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. We repeat part of the
wording in this deed for the convenience of the Court:
"... to be transferred under the following conditions:
That the property described herein be permanently maintained intact and used for public benefit and to remain
non-transferable in part or whole to private enterprise
and that a reasonable effort be made by the grantee to
maintain and use the property for the best interest of
the community." (Exh. 2, 11, 12).
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After the dedication contained m this deed, Dry
Hollow Road was used for various purposes by the general public without objection on the part of the owners
of the fee (see Statement of Facts). In July of 1964 (some
27 years after the dedication to public use above cited),
respondent paid the school board the sum of $10 for a
quit-claim deed, in favor of respondent, quit-claiming,
among other things, the right-of-way represented by Dry
Hollow Road. Section 27-12-90 (formerly 27-1-3) UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, as amended, states as follows:
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"All highways, once established, must con.
tinue to be highways until abandoned by order of
the Board of County Commissioners of the county '
in which they are situated, or other competent
authority."
Thus Dry Hollow Road by use and by acquiescence of
the owners of the fee, has been dedicated to public use .
by implication for a period of over sixty years. Further. ·
more, it has specifically been dedicated to public use by
a recorded deed executed by a public body for a period :
of some thirty years. An attempt to void this public ded.
ication by quit-claim deed is nullity.
!

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE ON
THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S CLAIM TO A
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT TO THE ROAD IN QUESTION
AS ALLEGED IN HER COMPLAINT AND AS SHOWN BY
HER EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.

The Court's attention is called to paragraphs 2 and
4 of the prayer of plaintiff's complaint in which the plain·
tiff-appellant asks the Court to declare that the plaintiff
"has the right to use the aforesaid right-of-way for ingress
and egress to the above described property," and "for an
order of the Court enjoining and restraining the defend·
ant from interfering with plaintiff's use of said right-of·
way in obtaining ingress and egress from said real
property."
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the case
of Morris vs. Blunt, et al, 49 UTAH 243, 161 P.
10
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1127, determined that "the right by prescription can only
arise by adverse use and enjoyment under claim of right
uninterrupted and continuous for a period of 20 years."
This case established the basic prescriptive period
for obtaining a right-of-way by adverse use in the State
of Utah and the Court goes on to say: "Under the wellestablished rule, the use, in order that it may ripen into
a prescriptive title, must, in any case, not only be adverse
and continuous, and under claim of right for a period
of twenty years, but it must be uninterrupted throughout
that period."
Applying the ruling of the Court to the facts in the
instant case, the Court's attention is called to the fact
that the record clearly discloses that the plaintiff-appellant and her predecessors in interest used the highway
or thoroughfare through the property of the defendantrespondent uninterruptedly for more than twenty years
under a claim of right, which was based on the facts
that there had been a written public dedication of the
highway or thoroughfare in question on which the plaintiff and her predecessors in interest had relied and, furthermore, the record discloses that plaintiff-appellant and
her predecessors in interest all took the position that this
was a public thoroughfare dedicated by reason of the
general use of the public over a period of time in excess
of sixty years and that in any event, plaintiff-appellant
and her predecessors in interest had a right to use the
road in question to maintain their water rights. Certainly, the record is clear that the claim to the use of

11

the roadway in question was based on the rights as here.
tofore set forth and shown in the record.
The record further indicates that the use by the
plaintiff-appellant was uninterrupted throughout the
prescriptive period of twenty years. There is evidence
that a fence and a gate was erected but that the plaintiff.
appellant's predecessor in interest was given a key to
the lock on the gate so that at no time was the plaintiff..
appellant or her predecessor in interest denied the right
to the use of the road in question. The Court's attention
is further called to the fact that the present fence and ,
gate, which the defendant-respondent locked in 1964, I
and which precipitated this lawsuit, was not erected by
the defendant-respondent but rather was placed there
by the State Highway Department to protect the state
highway right-of-way and prevent livestock from enter·
ing thereon from the private property adjacent to the
freeway right-of-way.
On the basis of the law and the facts in the record,
the plaintiff-appellant had acquired a prescriptive right
to the use of the property of the defendant-respondent
for the limited purpose of ingress and egress from the
state highway to her property.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING FROM THE
FACTS IN THE RECORD THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
HAD ACQUIRED A RIGHT-OF-WAY THROUGH DEFEND·
ANT-RESPONDENT'S LAND FOR THE PURPOSE OF
MAINTAINING HER WATER RIGHT, PURSUANT TO
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THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 73-1-15, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED.

The Legislature of this state many years ago realized
that water and proper access to the water at its point of
diversion created many feuding "Martin and McCoy" situations and therefore wisely enacted Section 73-1-15
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 195 3, as amended, imposing criminal penalties for a violation of a person's
right-of-way to maintain his rights to properly care for
his water along the water course up to the point of diversion. Said section reads as follows:
"Obstructing ditches or right-of-way - Penalty. - Whenever any person has a right-of-way
for any canal or other water course it shall be
unlawful for any person to place or maintain in
place any obstruction, by fence or otherwise, along
or across such canal or water course, without providing gates sufficient for the passage of the owner
of such canal or water course. Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of a
misdemeanor."
The record, as hereofore reiterated to this Court in
the Statement of Facts, clearly shows that plaintiff-appellant and her predecessors in interest had a water right
in the Bohman Springs and that pursuant to this right
she and her predecessors in interest had continuously,
for over twenty years, used the road in question for the
purpose of maintaining the water right and the water
course and that at no time prior to 1964 when the defendant-respondent placed a lock on the state highway
right-of-way gate was the plaintiff-appellant and her
predecessors in interest ever denied a right to use the
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road in question for the purpose of maintaining the !
water course of the water to which they were entitled [
I
to use out of the Bohman Springs.

While there is no evidence in the record that plaintiff-appellant has invoked the provisions of said Section I
I
73-1-15, this Court can take judicial notice of the laws ,
of the State of Utah as could the lower court and can !
therefore rule that plaintiff-appellant is entitled under
the laws of this state to the protection of her rights as
set forth in the above quoted section of our code.
CONCLUSION
While the law hesitates placing a burden upon pri·
vate property, either for a public use or a private use,
the law does clearly recognize both by statute and case
law that such rights can be acquired. The courts of this
state have indicated that where a thoroughfore has been
used continuously and openly by the general public for
a long period of time, sixty years or more, there arises
a strong presumption that such thoroughfare has been
dedicated by public use. Particularly is this true where
there has been a written public dedication and acquies·
cence over a long period of time by the owner of the
land over which the road in question runs and thereby
people have relied upon such facts and have used the
roadway openly, notoriously and with a claim of right
over such period of time.

i

1

Furthermore, a private individual can acquire a pre·
scriptive right through continuous, uninterrupted use ·
14
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under claim of right adverse to the rights of the owner
j I of the land over which the roadway in question runs
I
and plaintiff-appellant respectfully submits that the record clearly shows that she and her predecessors in interest
have acquired such a prescriptive right and the court
rr I
below should have ruled on this issue. In any event,
!
s: the plaintiff-appellant under the law has a right to mainrr'
tain the water course in the water right which she has
in the Bohman Springs and therefore is entitled to the
relief prayed for in her complaint under the provisions
of Section 73-1-15, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953,
as amended.
e'
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Respectfully submitted,
JAMES L. BARKER, JR. and
LEON A. HALGREN

Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent

IS

n

1346 Laird A venue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105

If

!S

n

·e

S·

1e

lf

I

I

i

11 I

e·
se .

15

